구제역 번역(한국어 원본)구제역 발생시 방역지침서인 해외악성가축전염병방역실시요령 및 구제역긴급방역행동지침(SOP)에 따라 방역조치가 이루어졌으며, 방역조치로서 구제역 발생농장 감염축과 인근지역 500m 감수성동물을 신속히 살처분 매몰하고 3km 이내의 감염우려가 있는 모든 돼지를 예방차원에서 살처분 매몰 조치하였다. 구제역 전파 확산을 방지하기 위하여 위험지역(반경 3km), 경계지역(반경 3~10km)의 방역대를 설정하여 가축의 이동, 출입자 및 출입차량 등에 대한 이동 통제를 실시하였다.
구제역 발생이 확인된 즉시 농림부에서는 구제역 비상대책본부가 설치되고, 국립수의과학검역원에서는 구제역 비상대책상황실, 시도에서는 시도 구제역 비상대책복부가 설치되어 24시간 보고체계가 구축되었다.
발생당시 3km 이내 지역의 살처분, 백신사용의 유무 등 주요 긴급방역 정책적인 결정은 농림부(MAF), 국립수의과학검역원(NVRQS), 수의학계, 축산단체 전문가로 구성된 가축방역중앙협의회를 통해 이루어졌다.
2000년 구제역 발생시 확산방지를 목적으로 위험지역내에 긴급예방접종을 실시하였던 것과는 달리 2002년 구제역 발생시에는 예방접종을 실시하지 않고, 살처분 정책을 실시하였다. 이러한 결정은 다음과 같은 사항을 바탕으로 이루어졌다.
돼지 집중사육지역에서 발생하였으며 주변 농가들이 이미 감염되었을 가능성이 높았다.
돼지에서 면역이 형성되기까지는 2-3주가 필요하며 이 기간동안에는 구제역 감염이 가능하다.
구제역이 퍼지고 있지 않았다.
백신을 사용할 경우 청정화 요청 대기기간이 연장된다.
백신접종팀에 의해 오히려 질병을 퍼뜨릴 가능성이 있다.
백신접종은 예찰을 어렵게 하며 새로운 발생을 찾아내는데 어려움이 있다.
한국은 구제역 발생에 대비하여 발생 이전부터 매년 300,000두분의 예방약 완제품확보와 아울러 영국 퍼브라이트(메리알사)에 구제역 항원뱅크를 구축하여 5,000,000두분을 비축하고 있으며, 2002년 발생시 전국적인 확산에 대비하여 ’02. 5월 700,000두분(Type 0)을 긴급 구입하여 국립수의과학검역원에 보관하고 있었다.
* 구제역 예방약에 대한 수입 · 보관관리 · 배정 권한은 농림부 감독하에 국립수의과학검역원이 행한다.
구제역 발생시 근절을 위한 긴급방역에 참여하는 주요 정부기관 및 그 기능은 다음과 같다.
– 농림부: 비상대책본부 설치 운용 및 방역대책 수립, 방역비 등 지원
– 국립수의과학검역원: 정밀진단, 역학조사, 현황 방역지도, 예방약 수급
– 시/도, 시/도 가축방역기관: 구제역 감염축 및 감염의심축 살처분, 이동통제 소독, 가축시장 등 폐쇄 등 방역조치
– 국정홍보처: 대국민 홍보
– 관세청: 가축 및 축산물의 불법 반입 단속 및 검색 협조
– 국방부: 이동통제 및 살처분 업무 협조
– 경찰청: 이동통제 협조
– 해양경찰청: 가축 및 축산물의 불법 반입 단속 및 검색 협조
구제역의 전파확산을 방지하고 신속한 근절을 위하여 발생농장 및 반경 500 m이내의 인근농장에서 사육되고 있는 모든 감수성 동물(90농가 97,202두)을 긴급 살처분하고, 발생농장 반경 3 km이내에 구제역 감염의 위험성이 있는 돼지를(72농가 62,953)를 예방적인 차원에서 살처분하는 등 총 162개 농장 160,155두의 감수성 동물을 살처분 매몰하였다. 또한2002년 발생당시 수포액에서 항원을 검사하는 신속진단킷트를 사용하여, 살처분 조치가 보다 빨리 이루질 수 있도록 하였다. |
구제역 번역(영어 번역본)In response to the outbreaks, Korean animal health authorities implemented a range of control measures including stamping-out of animals in infected and neighbouring farms, strict movement controls, disinfection activities, epidemiological investigations and surveillance in accordance with the Exotic Animal Disease Control Guidelines and FMD Emergency Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), a detailed manual that describes the required emergency measures in the event of an FMD outbreak.
With the confirmation of the FMD outbreak, emergency headquarters and emergency FMD control center was established at MAF and NVRQS, respectively to plan and coordinate emergency operations. Provincial emergency control centers were also established to quickly implement necessary control measures.
Throughout the outbreak, emergency meetings attended by MAF, NVRQS, veterinary experts and livestock-related associations were held to decide on the details of the control strategy. The decision not to use emergency vaccinations and the use of pre-emptive culling was decided through these meetings.
No vaccinations were performed during the 2002 outbreak. Although emergency ring vaccination was used successfully to control the 2000 FMD outbreak in Korea, it was concluded that the use of vaccines was not advisable for the 2002 outbreak. This was based on the following facts.
The outbreak was in intensive pig farming areas and it was likely that some surrounding farms would already be infected
Period required for pigs to gain immunity is 2-3 weeks, during which they would still be vulnerable to infection
The outbreak was not spreading out of control
The use of vaccination would prolong the required period to regain FMD free status
There was a risk of spread by vaccination teams
Vaccination would hinder the effectiveness of surveillance, making it difficult to detect any new FMD cases
There have been no FMD vaccinations of any kind in Korea since August 2000, when all emergency vaccinations were completed.
Republic of Korea maintains a vaccine reserve of 300,000 doses, which is stored at NVRQS, in case there is a need to quickly implement emergency vaccinations. In addition, NVRQS has a contract to maintain an antigen bank reserve of 5,000,000 doses at Pirbright (Merial Co.) in U.K. The strains are O1 Manisa, A22 Iraq and Asia1 Shamir.
NVRQS is the only authority permitted to import, maintain, and distribute (in emergency situations) FMD vaccines in Korea.
In the event of an FMD outbreak, major government organizations are to be involved in the effort to eradicate the disease as specified in the FMD emergency SOP and related guidelines.
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry: establishment of emergency headquarters, organization and implementation of emergency control measures, budgetary allocations, press reports.
National Veterinary Research and Quarantine Service: diagnosis, epidemiological investigation, surveillance, vaccine import/management/distribution, technical support and education
Provincial Animal Health Authority: clinical diagnosis, implementation of control measures such as disinfection and movement restrictions
Ministry of Information and Communication: communication and public awareness campaign
Ministry of National Defense: enforcement of movement restrictions and stamping out
National Police Agency: enforcement of movement restrictions
National Maritime Police Agency: prevention of illegal entry of livestock and livestock products
Korea Customs Service: prevention of illegal entry of livestock and livestock products
All susceptible animals in infected and neighboring farms within 500m radius were quickly culled and buried. This was especially important in pig farms because pigs produce a large amount of virus. During the 2002 outbreak, 13 of the 16 outbreak farms were culled within 24 hours of diagnosis, which was an important factor in reducing the spread of the disease. A total of 97,202 susceptible animals from 90 farms (including the infected farms) were destroyed and buried on or near the premises.
In addition, pre-emptive culling of all pigs within 3km radius of the infected farms was implemented and a total of 62,953 pigs from 72 farms were destroyed. Epidemiological analysis performed since the outbreak suggests that it was likely that some of the depopulated farms were incubating the disease and pre-emptive culling was effective in removing these possible sources of infection.
During the 2002 outbreak, pen-side antigen tests were used when possible to enable rapid confirmation of infection on the farm. This with the early reporting of suspect cases by farmers allowed stamping out to be undertaken quickly, thus lowering the risk of spread. |
